Abstract NTRUSign is the most practical lattice signature scheme. Its basic version was broken by Nguyen and Regev in 2006: one can efficiently recover the secret key from about 400 signatures. However, countermeasures have been proposed to repair the scheme, such as the perturbation used in NTRUSign standardization proposals, and the deformation proposed by Hu et al. at IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory in 2008. These two countermeasures were claimed to prevent the NR attack. Surprisingly, we show that these two claims are incorrect by revisiting the NR gradientdescent attack: the attack is more powerful than previously expected, and actually breaks both countermeasures in practice, e.g. 8,000 signatures suffice to break NTRUSign-251 with one perturbation as submitted to IEEE P1363 in 2003. More precisely, we explain why the Nguyen-Regev algorithm for learning a parallelepiped is heuristically able to learn more complex objects, such as zonotopes and deformed parallelepipeds.
Introduction
There is growing interest in cryptography based on hard lattice problems (see the survey [22] ). The field started with the seminal work of Ajtai [2] back in 1996, and recently got a second wind with Gentry's breakthrough work [7] on fully-homomorphic encryption. It offers asymptotical efficiency, potential resistance to quantum computers and new functionalities. There has been significant progress in provably-secure lattice cryptography in the past few years, but from a practical point of view, very few lattice schemes can compete with standardized schemes for now. This is especially true in the case of signature schemes, for which there is arguably only one realistic lattice alternative: NTRUSign [11] , which is an optimized instantiation of the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) signature scheme [9] using the compact lattices introduced in NTRU encryption [14] and whose performances are comparable with ECDSA. By comparison, signatures have size beyond 10,000 bits (at 80-bit security level) for the most efficient provably-secure lattice signature scheme known, namely the recent scheme of Lyubashevsky [19] .
However, NTRUSign has no provable-security guarantee. In fact, the GGH signature scheme and its simplest NTRUSign instantiation were broken at EU-ROCRYPT '06 by Nguyen and Regev [23] , who presented a polynomial-time key-recovery attack using a polynomial number of signatures: in the case of NTRUSign, 400 signatures suffice in practice to disclose the secret key within a few hours. In the GGH design, a signature is a lattice point which is relatively close to the (hashed) message. Clearly, many lattice points could be valid signatures, but GGH selects one which is closely related to the secret key: each message-signature pair actually discloses a sample almost uniformly distributed in a secret high-dimensional parallelepiped. The NR attack works by learning such a parallelepiped: given a polynomial number of samples of the form n i=1 x i b i where the x i 's are picked uniformly at random from [−1, 1] and the secret vectors b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ R n are linearly independent, the attack recovers the parallelepiped basis (b 1 , . . . , b n ), by finding minima of a certain multivariate function, thanks to a well-chosen gradient descent. The NR attack motivated the search of countermeasures to repair NTRUSign:
-The very first countermeasure already appeared in half of the parameter choices of NTRU's IEEE P1363.1 standardization proposal [17] , the other half being broken by NR. It consists of applying the signature generation process twice, using two different NTRU lattices, the first one being kept secret: here, the secret parallelepiped becomes the Minkowski sum of two secret parallelepipeds, which is a special case of zonotopes. This slows down signature generation, and forces to increase parameters because the signature obtained is less close to the message. However, no provable security guarantee was known or even expected. In fact, heuristic attacks have been claimed by both the designers of NTRUSign [10] and more recently by Malkin et al. [20] , but both are impractical: the most optimistic estimates [10, 20] state that they both require at least 2 60 signatures, and none have been fully implemented. Yet, as a safety precaution, the designers of NTRUSign [10] only claim the security of NTRUSign with perturbation up to 1 million signatures in [11] . Still, breaking this countermeasure was left as an open problem in [23] .
-In 2008, Hu, Wang and He [16] proposed a simpler and faster countermeasure in IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, which we call IEEE-IT, where the secret parallelepiped is deformed. Again, the actual security was unknown. -Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [8] proposed the first provably secure countermeasure for GGH signatures, by using a randomized variant [18] of Babai's nearest plane algorithm. However, this slows down signature generation significantly, and forces to increase parameters because the signatures obtained are much less close to the message. As a result, the resulting signature for NTRUSign does not seem competitive with classical signatures: no concrete parameter choice has been proposed.
Our Results. We revisit the Nguyen-Regev gradient-descent attack to show that it is much more powerful than previously expected: in particular, an optimized NR attack can surprisingly break in practice both NTRU's perturbation technique [11] as recommended in standardization proposals [17, 13] , and the IEEE-IT countermeasure [16] . For instance, we can recover the NTRUSign secret key in a few hours, using 8,000 signatures for the original NTRUSign-251 scheme with one perturbation submitted to IEEE P1363 standardization in 2003, or only 5,000 signatures for the latest 80-bit-security parameter set [13] proposed in 2010. These are the first successful experiments fully breaking NTRUSign with countermeasures. Note that in the perturbation case, we have to slightly modify the original NR attack. The warning is clear: our work strongly suggests to dismiss all GGH/NTRUSign countermeasures which are not supported by some provable security guarantee. Our work sheds new light on the NR attack. The original analysis of Nguyen and Regev does not apply to any of the two NTRUSign countermeasures, and it seemed a priori that the NR attack would not work in these cases. We show that the NR attack is much more robust than anticipated, by extending the original analysis of the Nguyen-Regev algorithm for learning a parallelepiped, to tackle more general objects such as zonotopes (to break the NTRUSign countermeasure with a constant number of perturbations) or deformed parallelepipeds (to break the IEEE-IT countermeasure). For instance, in the zonotope case, the parallelepiped distribution
n are secret vectors with m ≥ n. The key point of the NR attack is that all the local minima of a certain multivariate function are connected to the directions b i 's of the secret parallelepiped. We show that there is somewhat a similar (albeit more complex) phenomenon when the parallelepiped is replaced by zonotopes or deformed parallelepipeds: there, we establish the existence of local minima connected to the secret vectors spanning the object, but we cannot rule out the existence of other minima. Yet, the attack works very well in practice, as if there were no other minima.
Roadmap. In Sect. 2, we recall background on NTRUSign and the NR attack. In Sect. 3, we attack NTRU's perturbation countermeasure, by learning a zonotope. In Sect. 4, we attack the IEEE-IT countermeasure, by learning a deformed parallelepiped. More information is provided in the full version [5] .
Background and Notation

Notation
Sets. Z q is the ring of integers modulo q. N and Z denote the usual sets.
[n] denotes {1, · · · , n}. S n is the unit sphere of R n for the Euclidean norm . , whose inner product is , .
Linear Algebra. Vectors of R n will be row vectors denoted by bold lowercase letters. A (row) matrix is denoted by [b 1 , . . . , b n ]. We denote by M m,n (R) the set of m × n matrices over a ring R. The group of n × n invertible matrices with real coefficients will be denoted by GL n (R) and O n (R) will denote the subgroup of orthogonal matrices. The transpose of a matrix M will be denoted by M t , and M −t will mean the inverse of the transpose. For a set S of vectors in R n and M ∈ M n,m (R), S · M denotes the set {s · M : s ∈ S}. We denote by I n the n × n identity matrix.
Rounding. We denote by x the closest integer to x. Naturally, b denotes the operation applied to all the coordinates of b.
Distributions. If X is a random variable, we denote by E[X] its expectation. For any set S, we denote by U(S) the uniform distribution over S, when applicable. If D is a distribution over R n , its covariance is the n × n symmetric positive matrix Cov ( Zonotopes and Parallelepipeds. A zonotope is the Minkowski sum of finitely many segments. Here, we use centered zonotopes: the zonotope spanned by an
We denote by D Z(V ) the convolution distribution over Z(V ) obtained by picking independently each x i uniformly at random from [−1, 1] n : in other words,
n ) · V , which in general is not the uniform distribution over Z(V ). However, in the particular case V ∈ GL n (R), Z(V ) is simply the parallelepiped P(V ) spanned by V , and D P(V ) is equal to the uniform distribution over P(V ).
Running Times. All given running times were measured using a 2.27-GHz Intel Xeon E5520 core.
Lattices. We refer to the survey [24] for a bibliography on lattices. In this paper, by the term lattice, we mean a full-rank discrete subgroup of R n . A non-empty set L ⊆ R n is a lattice if and only if there exists
Any such B is called a basis of L, and the absolute value of its determinant is the lattice volume vol(L) of the lattice L. The closest vector problem (CVP) is the following: given a basis of L ⊆ Z n and a target t ∈ Q n , find a lattice vector v ∈ L minimizing the distance v − t . If d is the minimal distance, then approximating CVP to a factor k means finding v ∈ L such that v − t ≤ kd. Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) is a special case of CVP where the distance to the lattice is known to be small.
The GGH Signature Scheme
The GGH scheme [9] works with a lattice L in Z n . The secret key is a nonsingular matrix R ∈ M n (Z), with very short row vectors. Following [21] , the public key is the Hermite normal form (HNF) of L. The messages are hashed onto a "large enough" subset of Z n , for instance a large hypercube. Let m ∈ Z n be the hash of the message to be signed. The signer applies Babai's round-off CVP approximation algorithm [3] to get a lattice vector close to m:
so that s − m ∈ 1 2 P(R). To verify the signature s of m, one checks that s ∈ L using the public basis B, and that the distance s − m is sufficiently small.
NTRUSign
Basic scheme. NTRUSign [11] is an instantiation of GGH using the compact lattices from NTRU encryption [14] , which we briefly recall: we refer to [11, 4] for more details. In the former NTRU standards [4] proposed to IEEE P1363.1 [17] , N = 251 and q = 128. Let R be the ring Z[X]/(X N − 1) whose multiplication is denoted by * . One computes (f, g, F, G) ∈ R 4 such that f * G − g * F = q in R and f is invertible mod q, where f and g have 0-1 coefficients (with a prescribed number of 1), while F and G have slightly larger coefficients, yet much smaller than q. This quadruplet is the NTRU secret key. Then the secret basis is the following (2N ) × (2N ) block-wise circulant matrix:
and f i denotes the coefficient of X i of the polynomial f . Thus, the lattice dimension is n = 2N . Due to the special structure of R, a single row of R is sufficient to recover the whole secret key. Because f is chosen invertible mod q, the polynomial h = g/f mod q is well-defined in R: this is the NTRU public key. Its fundamental property is that f * h ≡ g mod q in R. The polynomial h defines the following (natural) public basis of the lattice:
implies that the lattice volume is q N . The messages are assumed to be hashed in {0, . . . , q − 1} 2N . Let m be such a hash. We write m = (m 1 , m 2 ) with m i ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} N . The signature is the vector (s, t) ∈ Z 2N which would have been obtained by applying Babai's round-off CVP approximation algorithm to m, except that it is computed more efficiently using convolution products and can even be compressed (see [11] ). We described the basic NTRUSign scheme [11] , as used in half of the parameter choices of the former NTRU standards [4] . Perturbations. The second half of parameter choices of NTRU standards [4] use perturbation techniques [10, 4, 12] to strengthen security, which are described in Sect. 2.5. But there is a second change: instead of the standard NTRU secret key, one uses the so-called transpose basis, which is simply R t , then the public basis remains the same, except that one defines the public key as h = F/f = G/g mod q rather than h = g/f mod q. New parameters. In the latest NTRU article [13] , new parameters for NTRUSign have been proposed. These include different values of (N, q) and a different shape for f and g: the coefficients of f and g are now in {0, ±1}, rather than {0, 1} like in [11] . But the scheme itself has not changed.
The Nguyen-Regev Attack
We briefly recall the Nguyen-Regev attack [23] , using a slightly different presentation. The NR attack solves the following idealized problem:
} be the parallelepiped spanned by V . The input to the HPP is a sequence of poly(n) independent samples from the uniform distribution D P(V ) . The goal is to find a good approximation of the rows of ±V .
In practice, instead of samples from D P(V ) , the attack uses 2(s − m) for all given message-signature pairs (m, s): this distribution is heuristically close to D P(V ) where R is the secret basis. To recover rows of R, the attack simply rounds the approximations found to integer vectors. The NR attack has two stages: morphing and minimization.
Morphing the Parallelepiped into a Hypercube. The first stage of the NR attack is to transform the hidden parallelepiped into a hidden hypercube (see Alg. 1), using a suitable linear transformation L. It is based on the following elementary lemma [23, Lemmas 1 and 2]: Lemma 1. Let V ∈ GL n (R) and denote by G ∈ GL n (R) the symmetric positive definite matrix V t V . Then:
Algorithm 1 Morphing(X ): Morphing a Parallelepiped into a Hybercube
Input: A set X of vectors x ∈ R n sampled from the uniform distribution
This stage is exactly (up to scaling) the classical preprocessing used in independent component analysis to make covariance equal to the identity matrix:
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Learning a Hypercube. The second stage of the NR attack is to solve the hidden hypercube problem, using minimization with a gradient descent (see Alg. 2). Nguyen and Regev [23] showed that for any
-The function mom D,4 (w) = E x←D [ x, w 4 ] has exactly 2n local minima over the unit sphere S n , which are located at ±v 1 , · · · , ±v n , and are global minima.
-It is possible to find all minima of mom D,4 (·) over S n in random polynomial time, using Alg. 2 with parameter δ = 3/4, thanks to the nice shape of mom D,4 (·). Alg. 2 is denoted by Descent(X , w, δ) which, given a point w ∈ S n , performs a suitable gradient descent using the sample set X , and returns an approximation of some ±v i .
Algorithm 2 Descent(X , w, δ): Solving the Hidden Hypercube Problem by Gradient Descent
Input: A set X of samples from the distribution D P(V ) where V ∈ On(R), a vector w chosen uniformly at random from Sn and a descent parameter δ. Output: An approximation of some row of ±V .
1: Compute an approximation g of the gradient ∇ momV,4(w) using X . 2: Let wnew = w − δg. return the vector w. 6: else 7:
Replace w by wnew and go back to Step 1.
8: end if
The whole NR attack is summarized by Alg. 3.
Algorithm 3 SolveHPP(X ): Learning a Parallelepiped [23]
Input: A set X of vectors x ∈ R n sampled from D P(V ) , where V ∈ GLn(R) Output: An approximation of a random row vector of ±V 1: L := Morphing(X ) using Alg. 1 2: X := X · L 3: Pick w uniformly at random from Sn 4: Compute r := Descent(X , w, δ) ∈ S n using Alg. 2: use δ = 3/4 in theory and δ = 0.7 in practice.
Shrinking the number of NTRUSign-signatures. In practice, the NR attack requires a polynomial number of signatures, but it is possible to experimentally decrease this amount by a linear factor [23] , using a well-known symmetry of NTRU lattices. We define the NTRUSign symmetry group S NTRU N as the group spanned by σ ∈ O n (R) : (x 1 , . . . Furthermore, (σ(m), σ(s) ) follows the same distribution as uniformly random (m, s). So, any pair (m, s) gives rise to N parallelepiped samples. This technique also allows a N -factor speedup for covariance computation, which is the most time consuming part of the attack.
Countermeasures
NTRUSign perturbation: Summing Parallelepipeds. Roughly speaking, these techniques perturbates the hashed message m before signing it with the NTRU secret basis. More precisely, the hashed message m is first signed using a second NTRU secret basis (of another NTRU lattice, which is kept secret), and the resulting signature is then signed as before. Heuristically, the effect on the sample distribution of the transcript is as follows: if R and R are the two secret bases, the distribution of s − m becomes the convolution P(R) ⊕ P(R ), i.e. a natural distribution over the Minkowski sum of the two parallelepipeds obtained by adding the uniform distributions of both parallelepipeds.
IEEE-IT perturbation: Parallelepiped Deformation. Hu et al. [16] suggested another approach to secure NTRUSign in the journal IEEE Trans. IT. Their definition are specific to NTRUSign-bases, but it can be generalized to GGH, and we call this technique "Parallelepiped deformation". Let
be a function, possibly secret-key dependent. The signature generation (1) is replaced by:
If δ outputs small integer vectors, then the signature s is still valid. The associated deformation function is d δ (x) = x + δ(x). The sample distribution of s − m is deformed in the following way :
In [16] , the deformation δ IEEE for a NTRUSign secret key (f, g, F, G) is as follows:
be the set of indexes u such that the u-th entry of f + g + F + G is 1 modulo 2, and let A = #U . On the average, A ≈ N/2, and it is assumed that A ≥ 25, otherwise a new secret key must be generated.
-Let the input of δ IEEE be the concatenation of two vectors x, y ∈ [-1 /2, 1 /2) N . Then the i-th entry of δ IEEE (x|y) is: Gaussian Sampling. Gentry et al. [8] described the first provably secure countermeasure: Gaussian sampling. In previous schemes, the distribution of s − m was related to the secret key. In [8] , the distribution becomes independent of the secret key: it is some discrete Gaussian distribution, which gives rise a to a security proof in the random-oracle model, under the assumption that finding close vectors is hard in the NTRU lattice. Unfortunately, this countermeasure is not very competitive in practice: the sampling algorithm [18] is much less efficient than NTRUSign generation, and the new signature is less close to the message, which forces to increase parameters. But its efficiency has recently been improved, see [26, 6] .
Learning a Zonotope: Breaking NTRUSign with Perturbations
In Sect. 3.1, we introduce the hidden zonotope problem (HZP), which is a natural generalization of the hidden parallelepiped problem (HPP), required to break NTRUSign with perturbations. In Sect. 3.2, we explain why the Nguyen-Regev HPP algorithm (Alg. 3) can heuristically solve the HZP, in cases that include NTRUSign, provided that Step 5 is slightly modified. Yet, the approximations obtained by the algorithm are expected to be worse than in the non-perturbed case, so we use a folklore meet-in-the-middle algorithm for BDD in NTRU lattices, which is described in [5] . Finally, in Sect. 3.3, we present experimental results with our optimized NR attack which show that NTRUSign with one (or slightly more) perturbation(s) is completely insecure, independently of the type of basis. In particular, we completely break the original NTRUSign proposed to IEEE P1363 standardization [4] : only one half of the parameter sets was previously broken in [23] .
The Hidden Zonotope Problem
Assume that one applies k − 1 NTRUSign perturbations as a countermeasure, which corresponds to k NTRUSign lattices L 1 , . . . , L k (with secret bases R 1 , . . . , R k ) where only L k is public. One signs a hashed message m ∈ Z n by computing
, which is a zonotope spanned by
And heuristically, the distribution of 2(s k − m) is the convolution of all the k uniform distributions D P(Ri) . In other words, similarly to the perturbation-free case, an attacker wishing to recover the secret key of a GGH-type signature scheme using perturbations using a polynomial number of signatures is faced with the following problem with m = kn:
Problem 2 (The Hidden Zonotope Problem or HZP) Let m ≥ n be integers, and V = [v 1 , . . . , v m ] be an m × n row matrix of rank n. The input to the HZP is a sequence of poly(n, m) independent samples from D = D Z(V ) over R n , which is the convolution distribution over the zonotope
The goal is to find a good approximation of the rows of ±V .
Here, we assume V to have rank n, because this is the setting of NTRUSign with perturbation, and because the HPP is simply the HZP with m = n.
Extending the Nguyen-Regev Analysis to Zonotopes
Here, we study the behavior of the original Nguyen-Regev algorithm for learning a parallelepiped ( SolveHPP(X ), Alg. 3) on a HZP instance, that is, when the secret matrix V is not necessarily square, but is an arbitrary m × n matrix of rank n with m ≥ n. To do this, we need to change the analysis of Nguyen and Regev [23] , and we will have to slightly change Alg. Morphing Zonotopes. We start with a trivial adaptation of Lemma 1 to zonotopes:
Lemma 3. Let V be an m × n matrix over R of rank n. Let G be the symmetric definite positive matrix V t V . Then:
Lemma 3 shows that if we apply Morphing(X ) (Alg. 1) to samples from D Z(V ) (rather than D P(V ) ), the output transformation L will be such that D Z(V ) · L is close to D Z(C) for some m × n matrix C such that C t C = I n . In other words, the effect of Step. 2 in SolveHPP(X ) (Alg. 3) is to make the zonotope matrix V have orthonormal columns: V t V = I n . The following lemma gives elementary properties of such matrices, which will be useful for our analysis:
Learning an "Orthogonal" Zonotope. Nguyen and Regev [23] used the target function mom D,4 (w) = E x←D [ x, w 4 ] for w ∈ S n , D = D P(V ) and V ∈ O n (R) to recover the hidden hypercube. We need to study this function when D is the zonotope distribution D = D Z(V ) to recover the hidden zonotope. Nguyen and Regev [23] gave elementary formulas for mom D,4 and ∇ mom D,4 when D = D P(V ) and V ∈ O n (R), which can easily be adapted to the zonotope distribution D Z(V ) if V t V = I n , as follows:
Lemma 5. Let V be a m × n matrix over R such that V t V = I n , and D be the convolution distribution D Z(V ) over the zonotope spanned by V . Then, for any w ∈ R n :
Corollary 1. Under the same hypotheses as Lemma 5, the minima over S n of the function mom D,4 (w) are the maxima (over
In [23, Lemma 3], Nguyen and Regev used Lagrange multipliers to show that when V ∈ O n (R), the local minima of mom D P(V ) ,4 were located at ±v 1 , . . . , v n , and these minima are clearly global minima. However, this argument breaks down when V is a rectangular m × n matrix of rank n such that V t V = I n . To tackle the zonotope case, we use a different argument, which requires to study each function f vi (w) = v i , w 4 individually:
Lemma 6. Let v ∈ R n and f v (w) = v, w 4 for w ∈ R n . Then: This already gives a different point of view from Nguyen and Regev in the special case where V ∈ O n (R): for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, v j is a local maximum of f vj and a local minimum of f vi for all i = j because v i ⊥ v j ; and therefore ±v 1 , . . . , v n are local extrema of mom U ·V,4 . In the general case where V is an m × n matrix such that
On the other hand, f vi (d j ) is likely to be small for i = j. This suggests that d j should be very close to a local maximum of the whole sum m i=1 f vi (d j ), provided that the local maximum v j 4 of f vj is somewhat larger than i =j f vi (d j ). In fact, this local maximum d j is intuitively shifted by g/(2 v j 4 ) where g is the gradient of
this is exactly what happens for its second-order Taylor approximation. This is formalized by our main result, which provides a sufficient condition on V guaranteeing that a given direction v j / v j is close to a local minimum of mom D Z(V ) ,4 : Theorem 3 (Local Minima for Zonotopes). Let V be a m × n matrix over R such that V t V = I n . Assume that there is α ≥ 1 such that V is α-weaklyorthogonal, that is, its m rows satisfy for all i = j:
over the unit sphere, the function mom D Z(V ) ,4 has a local minimum at some point m j ∈ S n such that m j is close to the direction of v j , namely:
And the local minimum mom D Z(V ) ,4 (m j ) discloses an approximation of v j , namely:
Proof. (Sketch of the proof in [5] ) Let B = {w ∈ S n : w − d j < ε} be the open ball of S n of radius ε, where d j = v j / v j ∈ S n Notice that for all w ∈ S n :
Therefore B = w ∈ S n : d j , w > 1 − ε 2 /2 , whose closure and boundary are denoted respectively byB and ∂B. Recall that f = m i=1 f vi . We will prove the following property:
which allows to conclude the proof of Th. 3. Indeed, by continuity, the restriction of f toB has a global maximum at some point m j ∈B. And (4) implies that m j ∈ ∂B, therefore m j ∈ B. Thus, m is a global maximum of f over the open set B: in other words, m j is a local maximum of f , and therefore a local minimum of mom D,4 . Furthermore, by definition of B, we have:
And the final inequality follows from:
We now prove (4). Let w ∈ ∂B. To show f (d j ) − f (w) > 0, we decompose it as:
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On the one hand, the left-hand term of (5) is:
because ε < 1/ √ 2. On the other hand, we upper bound the right-hand term of (5) by the Taylor-Lagrange formula, which states that there exists θ ∈ (0, 1)
The left-hand term of (7) is bounded as:
Using Lemma 6, the right-hand term of (7) can be bounded as:
Collecting (6), (7), (8) and (9), we obtain:
which is > 0 by (3). To conclude, it remains to prove that (3) is satisfied when
This is shown by tedious computations, using weak-orthogonality and Lemma 4.
Th. 3 states that under suitable assumptions on V (which we will discuss shortly), if v j is not too small, then the secret direction v j / v j is very close to a local minimum of mom D Z(V ) ,4 , whose value discloses an approximation of v j , because it is ≈ . This suggests SolveHZP(X ) (Alg. 4) for learning a zonotope: SolveHZP(X ) is exactly SolveHPP(X ) (Alg. 3), except that Step 5 of SolveHPP(X ) has been modified, to take into account that v j is no longer necessarily equal to 1, but can fortunately be approximated by the value of the local minimum.
First, we discuss the value of α in Th. 3 . Note that weak-orthogonality is a natural property, as shown by the following basic result: Lemma 7. Let v ∈ S n and denote by X the random variable X = v, w 2 where w has uniform distribution over S n . Then X has distribution Beta(1/2, (n − 1)/2), Exp(X) = By studying more carefully the Beta distribution, it is possible to obtain strong bounds. For instance, Ajtai [1, Lemma 47] showed that for all sufficiently large n, if v ∈ S n is fixed and w has uniform distribution over S n , then | v, w | ≤ (log n)/ √ n with probability ≥ 1 − 1 n (log n)/2−1 . Since the probability is subexponentially close to 1, this implies that if m = n O(1) and we assume that all the directions v i / v i are random, then V is (log n)-weakly orthogonal with probability asymptotically close to 1.
This gives strong evidence that, if m = n O(1) , the assumption on V in Th. 3 will be satisfied for α = log n. We can now discuss the remaining assumptions. If α = log n, we may take any index j such that v j ≥ Ω(1/n 13 ): in particular, if v j = Ω(1), we may take ε = O(log 3 n)/ √ n. And higher values of α can be tolerated, as while as α = o(n 1/6 ). Now recall that m i=1 v i 2 = n, thus max i v i ≥ n/m and v i is on average n/m. In particular, if the number of perturbations is constant, then m = O(n) and max i v i ≥ Ω(1), therefore Th. 3 applies to at least one index j, provided that α = o(n 1/6 ). In fact, one can see that the result can even tolerate slightly bigger values of m than Θ(n), such as m = o(n 7/6 / log n).
While Th. 3 explains why SolveHZP(X ) (Alg. 4) can heuristically solve the HZP, it is not a full proof, as opposed to the simpler parallelepiped case. The obstructions are the following:
-First, we would need to prove that the distance is sufficiently small to enable the recovery of the original zonotope vectors, using an appropriate BDD solver. Any error on v j / v j is multiplied by L −1 v j . In [23] , the error on v j could be made polynomially small for any polynomial, provided that the number of samples was (polynomially) large enough. But ε cannot be chosen polynomially small for any arbitrary polynomial in Th. 3.
-Second, we would need to prove that Descent(X , w, δ) (Alg. 2) finds a random local minimum of mom D Z(V ) ,4 in polynomial time, even in the presence of noise to compute mom D Z(V ) ,4 . Intuitively, this is not unreasonable since the function mom D Z(V ) ,4 is very regular, but it remains to be proved. -Finally, we would need to prove that there are no other local minima, or at least, not too many of them.
Regarding the third obstruction, it is easy to prove the following weaker statement, which implies that global minima of mom D Z(V ) ,4 over the unit sphere are close to some direction v j / v j :
Lemma 8. Let V be a m × n matrix over R such that V t V = I n , and D be the distribution D Z(V ) . Let w be a global maximum of f (w) = m i=1 f vi (w) over S n . Then there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that:
Experiments
We now report on experiments with the attack performed on NTRUSign, with n up to 502. Our experiments are real-world experiments using signatures of uniformly distributed messages.
Conditions of Th. 3. Our discussion following Th. 3 suggested that the matrix V should be heuristically weakly-orthogonal for α = log n. In practice, we may in fact take α ≈ 5 for both types of NTRUSign secret bases. Regarding the norms v i after morphing, we experimentally verified that v i ≈ 1/k where k is the number of perturbations for NTRUSign transposed bases (see [5] ), as expected by
But for the so-called standard bases, the situation is a bit different: half of the v i 's are very small, and the remaining half are close to 2/k. This can be explained by the fact that standard bases are unbalanced: half of the vectors are much shorter than the other vectors.
For a number of perturbations ≤ 8, we experimentally verified that the "gradient" g = Modifications to the original NR attack. We already explained that the original NR algorithm SolveHPP(X ) (Alg. 3) had to be slightly modified into SolveHZP(X ) (Alg. 4): more precisely, Step 5 is modified.
However, because Th. 3 states that the secret direction might be perturbed by some small ε, we also implemented an additional modification: instead of the elementary BDD algorithm by rounding, we used in the final stage a special BDD algorithm tailored for NTRU lattices, which is a tweaked version of Odlyzko's meet-in-the-middle attack on NTRU described in [15] . Details are given in [5] .
Practical cryptanalysis. We first applied successfully the optimized NR-attack on the original NTRUSign-251 scheme with one perturbation (which corresponds to a lattice dimension of 502), as initially submitted to the IEEE P1363 standard: about 8,000 signatures were sufficient to recover the secret key, which should be compared with the 400 signatures of the original attack [23] when there was no perturbation. This means that the original NTRUSign-251 scheme [10] is now completely broken.
Furthermore, we performed additional experiments for varying dimension and number of perturbations, for the parameters proposed in the latest NTRU article [13] , where transposed bases are used. Table 1 summarizes the results obtained: each successful attack took less than a day, and the MiM error recovery algorithm ran with less than 8Gb of memory. Table 1 . Experiments with the generalized NR-attack on the latest NTRUSign parameters [13] Our experiments confirm our theoretical analysis: NTRUSign with a constant number of perturbations is insecure, but we see that the number of signatures required increases with the number of perturbations.
Learning a Deformed Parallelepiped: Breaking the IEEE-IT Countermeasure
In this section, we show that the deformation suggested in [16] is unlikely to prevent the NR attack [23] . More generally, we show that the NR attack heuristically still works if the deformation is only partial, which means that it preserves at least one of the canonical axes, namely there exists at least one index i such that:
-for all x ∈ [-1 /2, 1 /2) n , [δ(x)] i = 0 -δ(x) is independent of x i : (∀j = i, x j = y j ) ⇒ δ(x) = δ(y)
Such an index i is said to be ignored by the deformation δ. And it is clear that δ IEEE is partial by definition (see Sect. 2.5), because it ignores exactly all index i / ∈ U . Our main result is the following, whose proof is given in [5] .
Theorem 4. Let δ be a partial deformation, and i be an index ignored by δ. Let D = 2·d δ (U n ) and M ∈ GL n (R) be an invertible matrix and G = Cov(D·M ). Let While this is a strong theoretical argument supporting why the NR attack still works, it is not a full proof, for reasons similar to the zonotope case (see the previous section): there may be other minima, and we did not prove that the gradient descent efficiently finds minima.
Experimental results
The attack was run, using 300,000 signatures, to recover the secret key in 80-bit, 112-bit and 128-bit NTRUSign security level settings, and each run led to a secret key recovery, in about two days. No other local minimum was found. Though the samples no longer belong to a set stable by NTRU symmetry group S NTRU N , we may still try to apply the symmetry trick, to multiply the number of samples by N , like in [23] . This modifies the distribution of the sample to the average of its orbit : S ). It turns out that applying the attack on such an averaged distribution leads once again to descents converging to some basis vectors: in fact, by symmetry, all of them are equally likely. The attack used 2,000 signatures, and ran in less than an hour, on the same basis. Intuitively, this averaging strongly reduces the co-dependence between the coordinates of x ← D σ , making the resulting distribution much closer to a parallelepiped than D.
